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Chapter 21 
 
 
Heated debates and cool analysis: thinking well about financial 
ethics 
By Christopher J. COWTON 
 and 
Yvonne DOWNS 
 
 
Introduction 
Not for the first time, the banks and other financial institutions have got themselves – and the 
rest of us – into a mess, this time on an unprecedented financial and geographical scale. It is 
no surprise that opinions about causes, consequences and cures abound with ethical issues, as 
well as technical and economic concerns, a focus of attention. It is to be hoped that useful 
lessons for the future will be learned.  
 
 
In this chapter, however, we step back from a direct engagement with the stated ills of the 
financial system itself, whether actual or perceived, chronic or acute. Our starting point is that 
crisis in the financial system not only makes us stop and think; but it might also, particularly 
under conditions of moral panic, prevent us from thinking well. Our contention is that a 
further impediment to thinking well about financial crises is the lack of a substantial body of 
academic knowledge that might be termed ‘financial ethics’ – a corpus of well developed 
conceptual insights and appropriate empirical evidence. We identify some of the reasons for 
this situation and proffer some suggestions regarding what might be done to remedy it – 
including the development of knowledge that is as relevant to everyday practices during 
periods of normality as it is to providing perspectives on crisis. The chapter is structured as 
follows: the next section provides a perspective on debate during times of crisis; the middle 
section seeks to explain why academic financial ethics is not a significant constituent element 
of debate on the financial crisis post-2007; and the final two main sections explore ways in 
which an academic agenda for financial ethics might be constructed. In a curious way this 
chapter echoes some of the themes and especially the conclusion of David Bevan’s chapter in 
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this work (chapter18) although the reasoning to the conclusion that finance ethics is an empty 
set follows a rather different Badiou-inspired path in chapter 18.   
 
 
Debating the financial crisis 
It is characteristic of a major crisis for many voices to be raised, calling attention to problems, 
identifying ‘scandals’, attributing blame and proposing solutions. In the recent financial crisis 
three distinct, albeit related, sets of debate might be heard: popular debate, which tends 
towards narratives of individual immoral behaviour and excess (Curtis, Harney and Jones 
2013); policy debate, which focuses on the need to identify and remedy structural flaws in the 
regulation of markets and institutions; and academic debate. However, this last has been heard 
to only a limited extent. The reasons for this are explored in the next section. Our argument is 
not that academics have been overlooked or ignored, but that, at least when it came to ethics, 
they were unable to make a substantial contribution or to impact on understanding because 
there existed no corpus of well-established, practically relevant knowledge; or at least not to 
the extent necessary to inform, let alone drive, the direction of debates. Unlike various other 
parties, academics were not ‘standing ready’ with a substantial body of knowledge that we 
might call ‘financial ethics’. 
 
 
As attention is directed in times of crisis from the ordinary and everyday towards the 
exceptional and extreme, the opportunity arises for various parties to add weight to previously 
held but otherwise unsubstantiated theories of perceived ills, and to prioritise particular policy 
agendas, drawing in large part on pre-existing resources and beliefs. These proponents of 
particular positions outside academe opportunistically – albeit genuinely – engage in vigorous 
debate about the financial crisis. Well established political and social agendas mean that they 
are poised, ready to make a well-articulated – if shallow or partisan – contribution at a 
moment’s notice. 
 
 
The tendency in popular debate is towards narratives of individual immoral behaviour (Curtis, 
Harney & Jones, 2013) which tend to be articulated and disseminated in the media, 
particularly through written and broadcast journalism, and taken up more widely by other 
sectors of society. Policy debate focuses more on the presence of structural flaws and the 
reformation and regulation of markets and firms. Although the term ‘policy’ suggests that 
these debates are a matter for governments, this is not necessarily the case. The call to hold 
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bankers individually and criminally accountable for ethical lapses in the system, voluble in 
the press, have also found an echo in certain areas of the corridors of power for example. 
 
 
A crisis might therefore make us (academics and others) stop and think, yet it might also 
prevent us from thinking well; focusing on the extreme creates a climate in which moral panic 
thrives. The origin of the term ‘moral panic’ is unclear but is often attributed to the 
sociologist, Stanley Cohen. Krinsky (2013, p.1) summarises the concept thus: 
 
 
A moral panic may be defined as an episode, often triggered by alarming media stories 
and reinforced by reactive laws and public policy, of exaggerated or misdirected 
public concern, anxiety, fear, or anger over a perceived threat to social order. 
 
 
 
In other words it refers to a social rather than individual phenomenon that requires 
institutional support to prosper (Furedi, 2013).  
 
 
Two further concepts are relevant here – those of the moral scandal and the moral crusade. In 
short, moral scandals generate noise and/or action and create social upheaval akin to a 
‘crusade’. These concepts may be applied to representations of the financial crisis. Echoes of 
each are detectable not only in popular discourse and policy debates, with calls for greater 
regulation of financial markets and the activities of those employed in financial sectors 
(Curtis, Harney and Jones, 2013) and for often punitive measures against them, but also in the 
academic literature. Indeed, Krugman (2012) argues that the field of economics is rife with 
moralistic undertones. Debates about bankers’ bonuses, for example, are most usually 
couched in terms of whether these are 'deserved', rather than 'affordable' or 'appropriate', for 
example.  
 
 
However, thinking about finance and financial systems in a time of panic or a climate of 
retribution is hardly likely to be conducive to thinking with deep and enduring relevance. 
Attending to those constant features of finance, which the recent focus on crisis and panic 
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obscures, presents academics with the chance not only to increase their own academic and 
intellectual capital, but also to make an impact on debates taking place outside the academy. 
 
 
Such ‘outsider’ interest is not without merit, because academics are arguably a group to 
whom society might look for mature, sophisticated and objective advice and opinion, 
particularly in troubled times. Both the conceptual insights and empirical evidence afforded 
by academic endeavour, including (or even especially) ethics, could be a valuable resource on 
which to draw and inform wider discussion. However, this is far from being the case at 
present. The academic contribution has failed to provide a sufficiently robust and insightful 
counterpoint to other kinds of popular and policy debate. Indeed, it might be said that it is 
almost entirely absent from it. This is not primarily for the reasons that are usually cited for a 
lack of impact of academic work outside the academy – namely poor communication or lack 
of relevance – but because academic financial ethics barely exists. 
 
 
On the lack of (academic) financial ethics 
One of the familiar witticisms about business ethics – and, even more so, financial ethics – is 
that a book about it should be very short indeed.  Purveyors of such well-worn humour are 
making a point about the practice of business (or finance).  Whether or not their 
characterisation is accurate or fair, they are not so wide of the mark when it comes to 
academic financial ethics.  Notwithstanding a few books (e.g. Boatright, 2010, 2014) and 
some articles in the business ethics journals, the amount of sustained academic work is 
remarkably small. We begin by mapping financial ethics as a field and use this as a point of 
departure to explain why academic study seems to have so little to contribute to real world 
debates.  
 
 
Part of the problem might be seen as traceable to a lack of clarity about what financial ethics 
is. According to Boatright (2010, p.3) finance is 'the generation, allocation, exchange and 
management of monetary resources' and the main topic areas pertain to personal finance, 
corporate finance and public finance. He also contends that the study of financial, or, to use 
his terminology, finance ethics has become concentrated into four main loci of interest; that 
is, finance theory, financial markets, financial services and financial management. Financial 
ethics as an academic field, then, is concerned with the moral issues that arise and the moral 
norms that apply to all the activities taking place within each of these loci. In other words, 
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when we talk of financial ethics we are in fact talking about a potentially huge and diversified 
landscape. Although Boatright's isolation of these topic areas, loci of interest and the nature of 
ethical concerns that arise within them are a useful description of the practice of what he calls 
'finance ethics' as an academic field, a conceptual unpacking rather than the descriptive 
exercise he has undertaken here does seem somewhat more difficult to effect. Does use of the 
term 'finance ethics' imply something that is qualitatively different to 'financial ethics' for 
example? We have used the terms interchangeably here but can we assume this is simply a 
matter of semantics?  
 
 
Like business ethics, of which it is arguably a subset, financial ethics will perhaps always 
suffer from the lack of a clear academic identity because it is a field rather than a discipline 
(Cowton and Haase, 2008). Whilst this may be a positive thing in that 'many different 
disciplinary perspectives can fruitfully be brought to bear' (p.1), the field of financial ethics 
risks being overloaded with the conceptual, methodological and ontological baggage of a 
number of other disciplines and fields (ethics, economics, business, accountancy and so on), 
particularly as some of these may themselves be multi-disciplinary. On the one hand this may 
be seen as enriching and expanding the field, but on the other it may militate against the 
possibility of financial ethics gaining a recognisable identity of its own, particularly as this 
may require the acquisition of paradigmatic status to be effected. Kuhn (1996, p.175) 
describes a paradigm as ‘the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on 
shared by the members of a given community’. It is difficult to develop a community identity 
if members possess pre-existing allegiances to communities outside the field. Financial ethics 
cannot therefore be considered to possess paradigmatic status, but as a field of academic 
endeavour it imports paradigmatic practices from a range of other disciplines. If not strictly 
incommensurable (Kuhn, 1996), many of these are likely to be uneasy bedfellows. Boatright 
points out, for example, that finance scholars who have a good grounding in, and 
understanding of, finance theory are constrained by a research paradigm that excludes 
normative questions and demands the use of particular methodologies and analytical tools 
(p.3). Business ethicists on the other hand, who are versed in the ways of moral philosophy or 
empirical social scientific research, tend to lack the necessary grounding in finance theory to 
enable them to contribute with confidence. 
 
 
Although we will not pursue this point further, it does nevertheless suggest that a failure to 
delineate the parameters of the various aspects of the field and their overlapping and discrete 
features may constitute the first obstacle to the consolidation of financial ethics into a strong, 
recognisable and recognised field instead of the neglected and underdeveloped one it 
currently constitutes. However, Boatright's argument about the divide between finance and 
business scholars speaks not only to the bodies of knowledge and communities of practice 
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that pertain to each, and a divide that can be crudely represented as the divide between 
philosophy and social science, but also to broader issues of the divide between conceptual and 
empirical work. However, in his analysis of business ethics Cowton (2008) points out that the 
difference between the conceptual and empirical should not be overdrawn. We are therefore 
of the view that, rather than the root of the problem being a conceptual/empirical divide, or 
even the fact/value divide (see Cowton, 1998) the problem is caused by the failure of financial 
ethics scholars, loosely described and such as they are, to adequately capture and 
conceptualise their field and the relationship between conceptual and empirical work (they 
may not be the only group guilty of this sin, but they are the ones under scrutiny here).  
 
 
Although his interest was not in financial ethics per se but in business finance, Whitley's 
(1986) detection of a dynamic between theoretical and empirical work provides useful 
pointers here. In a discussion of what he saw as the transformation in the US of business 
finance as an intellectual field with strong descriptive content into financial economics, he 
argues that 'a high degree of theoretical abstraction and formality coupled with 'considerable 
empirical uncertainty' shaped prevailing understandings of the intellectual constitution and 
disciplinary parameters of the field. In short, business finance assumed the identity of 
financial economics with the concomitant dominance of mathematical models, the exclusion 
of 'lay involvement in setting intellectual goals or standards' (p. 172) and the 'scientification' 
of research and of 'formal research on esoteric and idealised problems' (p.172). Such a 
transformation has made it more difficult for finance scholars to acknowledge and treat ethical 
issues except in the most attenuated way (e.g. agency theory). 
 
 
However, we must emphasise here the contextual specificity of Whitley's argument. The 
nature of the conceptual and empirical works to which he alludes, based as they were on 
scientific and particular mathematical models and uncertainty and inconclusiveness 
respectively, took place at a time when there was rapid expansion of business schools in the 
US, which was accompanied by a desire for academic legitimacy.  Moreover, this occurred 
shortly after the Second World War, when the natural sciences enjoyed high prestige, when 
there were changes in the US in the organisation of financial markets and when close 
connections between the academy and financial institutions and employers were fostered and 
maintained. Nevertheless, the basic tenet of Whitley's argument holds good here. It is not in 
any perceived divide between conceptual and empirical work that problems are created but in 
the nature of their dynamic in particular academic and historical contexts. This brings us then 
to a consideration of the ways in which financial ethics scholarship is failing to engage 
sufficiently with its location in its current context. 
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Consistent with Whitley’s account, according to Keasey and Hudson (2007, p. 933) a failure 
to connect 'the rich complexities of the context' in which it is practised is endemic to finance 
research and scholarship. Connecting with Frankfurter's (1994) use of the metaphor of the 
temple, they liken finance theory to a 'house without windows'. In short, finance scholars 
dwell in a space where there is internal consistency but no engagement with the outside 
world. Whilst scholars are supplied with external 'data feeds', these are interpreted 'from the 
perspective of their agreed research paradigm and any facts which are seen as anomalies give 
rise to a whole new spate of activity to see how they can be reconciled with the existing core 
theory'.  
 
 
Perhaps financial ethicists (such as they are) cannot have common cause with them here. 
Teachers and students of finance theory may enjoy a greater element of safety from critical 
enquiry, because few outside the academic world understand the mathematical language or 
abstraction at its core. This means that they can keep the core of the subject safe. Whereas 
Keasey and Hudson imply that finance theorists are unaware of much that is going on, or at 
the very least keep it at bay so they may not be troubled by it, financial ethicists cannot fail to 
be aware of what is going on around them, as it is daily reported by the mass media. Indeed, 
they use reference to scandals and crisis to motivate much of their writing. 
 
 
Not only does the finance literature pay little attention to ethics, but business ethics journals 
have traditionally published few papers on finance.  There might be several reasons for this: 
perhaps researchers feel that finance is too technical or demanding for them to engage with; or 
perhaps they find it uninteresting and other topics more attractive; or maybe they – wrongly – 
think finance unimportant.  Nevertheless, whatever the reasons, Curtis Harvey & Jones (2013, 
p.65) comment that 'before the crisis, what we might call an ethics of finance began to come 
into view; but in the heat of the crisis, most accounts fell back on the separation of the 
supposedly distinct practices of finance and ethics'.   
 
 
We would venture to say that, by focusing on crisis in a climate of moral scandals, panics and 
crusades rather than on the underlying and enduring ethical challenges that are part of the 
fabric of financial systems, financial ethics (to the extent it is developing) is contributing to its 
own future irrelevance, and this for several reasons. First, journalists will always be more 
nimble than academics in terms of their contribution to the debate as they are not required to 
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base their analysis on painstaking searches through the literature or through rigorous 
empirical research, nor need they subject them to theoretical tests or to connect them with 
bodies of extant knowledge. Quite simply, the structural location of academics militates 
against their preparedness for acute situations, let alone crisis. Second, in focusing on crisis 
academics are distracting themselves from that to which they might more productively and 
effectively apply themselves, namely to the long-term, to the deep seated and to the everyday. 
Third, considering those things against which their location and the nature of the job militates, 
means that academics are not thinking optimally. It may be going too far to say they are 
wasting their time, but it is hard to see how it is best used by focusing on crisis. Add to this 
mix critiques about the adherence to inadequate conceptual and empirical models and 
fondness for abstraction, and it seems little wonder that there is little academic financial ethics 
ready and available for use in debates.  
 
 
The way(s) forward 
So what might it mean to think well, or more generally to do good research, about financial 
ethics?  Different areas of research involve different conventions and standards regarding how 
analysis of ethical issues is best conducted, which should be adhered to by financial ethicists 
drawing on those traditions (see Cowton 2008 for a similar argument regarding business 
ethics).  However, given our earlier assessment of the field we need more, not just better, 
financial ethics research; and given our comments on the narrow and introspective 
development of finance, as per Whitley (1986) and Keasey & Hudson (2007), it would make 
sense for this research to be open to perspectives from multiple academic fields and 
disciplines and influences from the world of financial practice. Thus, for financial ethics, 
given its embryonic state, the question is not just how we research, in some narrow 
methodological sense, but how the field itself is constructed – a question, in effect, of what 
we research.  To extend Keasey & Hudson’s metaphor, if we think of financial ethics as 
occupying a ‘room’ within the academic ‘house’, there are several other rooms we can visit 
for resources and guidance, and there are windows through which to gaze upon the financial 
world (though the distance implied by gazing through the window should not be taken to have 
methodological implications!) 
 
 
This notion of academic stimuli or resources, on the one hand, and external influences on the 
other, is consistent with the analysis of the development of academic business ethics to be 
found in Cowton (2008). 
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He (one of the current authors) makes the point that 'through our decisions about what we do 
or do not study and write about, we will determine the future shape of the scholarly literature 
– what it addresses successfully and on what it remains silent or inadequate' (p.11). This 
entails awareness of the influences that are brought to bear from within and outside the 
academy. He cites previous literature, debates in academic disciplines, extant research, 
resources allocated to research and the curriculum as those that emanate from inside the 
academy.  
 
 
From the inside out 
In this section we focus largely on the factors that are shaping the academic identity of the 
field and which in turn influence the way it connects with the world outside the academy. We 
take up in particular the influence of other academic disciplines on the finance ethics research 
agenda, specifically that of philosophy and of sociology, and develop the argument we have 
begun about why finance ethics scholars have found themselves on the outside of debates 
about the financial crisis.  
 
 
Financial ethics and philosophy 
Until relatively recently, moral philosophers and ethical theorists have shown little or no 
interest in finance. Indeed, for much of the twentieth century, Anglo-Saxon philosophers were 
occupied with the nature of language and even though moral philosophy took a more applied 
turn towards the end of the twentieth century, particularly in the US, it was a turn to matters 
of life and death (Cowton, 2012; Cowton & Crisp, 1998). Euthanasia, abortion, animals and 
the natural environment have all claimed philosophical attention in ways that finance has not, 
perhaps because finance was not regarded as a concern of such huge import. Medical ethics 
could more easily be associated with these big ideas. Perhaps finance was not seen as 
important enough, too technical, or perhaps even boring (Cowton, 2012). However, in view of 
recent reports of sharp increases in the number of people attending general medical 
practitioners’ surgeries with symptoms of depression, in the prescription of antidepressants 
and in the number of suicides all linked, if only anecdotally, to the austerity measures being 
employed to tackle the crisis, it may also be said that life, death and finance have now been 
brought into greater proximity. Moreover, the generally disruptive effects of the financial 
crisis and the issues it has raised make it clear that some deep thinking is required about the 
nature and societal effects of finance and of financial institutions such as banks (Cowton, 
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2012). Philosophy is arguably the strongest tool for the job of thinking. Indeed, Crisp (1998, 
pp. 9-10) goes so far as to suggest that philosophy provides 'the best way we know to 
approach the truth about how our economic and business life should be'. 
 
 
However, certain risks have been identified in affording greater space to philosophy within 
the field of financial ethics. Not least, the reliance on philosophy could mean that the field of 
finance ethics becomes (even further) 'disconnected from its object of study' (Cowton, 2008, 
p.16), as financial ethics is drawn into, or even exaggerates, the practices or developments in 
philosophy. Sorrell (1998, p. 83) for example noted a tendency by business ethicists who were 
drawing on philosophical traditions 'to pursue the subject with as much theoretical apparatus 
as they can bring to bear' in order to prove the academic credentials of their subject. As 
Whitley (1986) highlighted and Cowton (2008) emphasises, contributions to knowledge never 
take place in a vacuum but are susceptible both to internal and external pressures. The 
pressure to establish and legitimise a distinct academic identity cannot but influence the way 
in which philosophy becomes incorporated into the field. In this regard Cowton suggests it 
may not be the inherent failings of philosophy itself, but the way it is sometimes done that is 
at fault here. Perhaps there is over-reliance on the perceived orthodoxies of the discipline and 
not enough critical scrutiny and reflection on how philosophy (or indeed any other subject) 
might be best taken up; or there might even be erroneous misconceptions about what ‘doing 
applied ethics’ means. Moreover, the field is likely to suffer less from such risks if the sources 
on which it draws are not confined to one academic discipline – assuming that the field itself 
does not become rigidly fragmented.  
 
 
This basic understanding of the contextualised adoption of different disciplinary knowledge 
and practices into a burgeoning field will also provide the backdrop to the next part of the 
discussion which looks at the risks and opportunities afforded by sociology. 
 
 
Financial ethics and sociology 
It has been argued that the temptation to super-abstraction and hyper-theorisation that (we are 
implying) a finance ethics drawing on philosophical traditions must resist, might be mitigated 
by the introduction of social scientific perspectives, particularly as 'they bring with them an 
orientation towards empirical research, which might suggest a stronger connection with the 
"real world" and thus reduce the risk of irrelevance' (Cowton, 2008, p. 16). It is certainly true 
that social scientists have much experience in researching the 'sensitive issues' which seem to 
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so trouble finance ethicists. However, just as philosophy can be done well or badly, and lead 
to bad or good practice, much depends on the conception of social science that is adopted and 
the practice of social science that is applied. If empirical research is to play a key role in 
knowledge generation in the field, it can only do so if adequate thought is given to the nature 
of its influence. Debates rage within social science, and even within the disciplines it 
encompasses, amongst other things, over the relative merits of quantitative versus qualitative 
research paradigms, over methods, over the criteria to be used in assessments of research 
quality, and importantly over ethics. These will need to be dealt with in the field of finance 
ethics, particularly one seeking to delineate its own academic identity, but there is little 
evidence that such matters are currently being engaged with, let alone addressed. 
 
  
A review of the journal literature in the allied, and slightly better developed, field of 
accounting ethics scholarship, for example, revealed that 'there is much work still to be done' 
(Bampton and Cowton, 2013, p. 561), not least in respect of research quality. The requirement 
to take a step back, as it were, to consider the relationship between the how and the what may 
not have immediate appeal, particularly when the climate of moral panic imparts a sense of 
urgency in the demand for the provision of substantive contributions. But, in the first place, 
we have argued that finance ethics is currently ill-prepared to make such a contribution 
anyway and we have also suggested that quick-fire responses per se are not necessarily the 
business of academics anyway – unless already well worked out from a sound basis. We 
would venture to say that it is through painstaking research – which is aware of its own 
limitations as well as its strengths, and which understands that the knowledge generated will 
at least in some part reflect the methods of its generation – that a strong body of knowledge 
may be built, enabling financial ethics to stand ready when the next crisis requires a rapid 
response.  
 
 
Bampton and Cowton (p. 561) also recommend, amongst other things, that there should be 
more qualitative work undertaken. However, this too will require some critical forethought. 
On the one hand, if empirical finance ethics adopts a quantitative model of social science it is 
likely that this will reinforce the mathematical and statistical orientation of the field of 
finance, which in turn will continue to shape it in a particular way; in other words, precisely 
the way which will be unlikely to establish its connections to the everyday concerns of 
constituencies outside the academy. But if it were to embrace a qualitative approach this 
would also require changing mind sets as well as methods. In other words it will necessitate 
something seismic along the lines of a paradigm shift, if indeed financial ethics is more 
readily understood as a paradigm than clearly delineated field of knowledge or practice. The 
view that research might be reduced to a set of technical operations is inadequate here. At the 
same time it would be hard to argue for a field of finance ethics that adopted qualitative 
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research as the dominant paradigm. This would also be reductive in its own way. We 
emphasise again the fruitfulness of paying heed to the relationship between the what and the 
how (Cowton, 1998, 2008). 
 
 
Having mapped one possible route for the future direction of the field we will now look 
outside the academic ‘house’ and consider how financial ethics might be supported in its 
necessary evolution by conditions and developments in the wider world.  
 
 
From the outside in 
Our starting point here is that internal solutions can only go part of the way in increasing the 
potential for finance ethics to become established as a key contributor to understandings in the 
real world. We also suggest that there is a requirement to look beyond the academy and 
consider how external influences are brought to bear on the meaning and constitution of the 
field. Cowton (2008) has outlined some of the ways in which business ethics might close the 
gap between itself and the business world. Here it is more difficult to simply extrapolate to 
the world of finance ethics but his consideration of societal issues does offer some way 
forward. With regard to those, Carroll (2000) suggests that it is not in the analysis of current 
issues that ethics can be most useful, but in the anticipation of challenges that lie ahead. But 
Cowton (2008, p. 28) sounds a note of caution here because, to re-iterate, 'scandals are as 
much about social perception as they are about what happened, and they can lead to moral 
panic and hence over-reaction, diverting attention from other, perhaps less spectacular but 
equally important issues'. However, it would be wrong to think the world of the academy, or 
of any field or discipline within it, could shut itself off from the world outside, even were it to 
make no effort to be an explicit part of it. Even in the eye of the storm we are part of it.  
 
 
The Ethics Resource Center has produced a timeline of developments in business ethics, 
linked to the ethical climate and the major ethical dilemmas of particular decades in the US 
(http://www.ethics.org/resource/business-ethics-timeline). Thus, broadly speaking, in the 
1960s the ethical climate changed such that old values were being cast aside and loyalty to an 
employer gave way to loyalty to ideals. There was social unrest and anti- war sentiment and 
employees had an adversarial relationship with management. The major ethical dilemmas at 
the time pertained to environmental issues, increased employee-employer tension, civil rights 
issues, honesty, changes in the work ethic and the escalation of drug use. These external 
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changes were reflected in the establishment of codes of conduct and values statements, the 
birth of the social responsibility movement and addressing ethical issues through legal or 
personnel departments. Whether one agrees with the detail of the analysis, or the value 
judgements that underpin them, is another matter, but the point is that imbibing the Zeitgeist 
may be something that cannot be avoided. In this case the project before us is not to 
understand how we may influence outside events (an increasing demand upon universities and 
especially business schools) but how we are always and already influenced by them. The 
implication is that, whether we are aware of it or not, contextual location and the dynamics 
this creates impacts on our research agendas, theoretical perspectives and methodological 
orientations and it would enable us to think better if we were to engage with these. In the next 
section therefore we shall consider some of the elements required as a precondition to this. 
 
 
Thinking well about financial ethics  
Bauman (1988) has argued that academic expertise and knowledge has become less central to 
capitalist reproduction which has in turn allowed greater detachment of academic concerns 
from political debate and less need to anchor it in lay concerns. On this reading academic 
endeavour has little purpose other than as a self-referential exercise, as good a way of 
spending one's time on earth as any. We take a different, more optimistic, view and the points 
that follow are intended to initiate discussion about how Bauman might have been persuaded 
to think again before taking up this position. Our intention is that, in the course of engagement 
with the areas we highlight for attention, financial ethics might develop its academic identity 
and increase its real world relevance without falling into the trap of sacrificing either on the 
altar of perceived academic legitimacy or of replacing one paradigm with another. 
 
 
The first aspect of finance ethics research to which we would draw attention is the need to 
avoid polarisation and to focus on the relationship and dynamics of particular phenomena, 
events and situations. Therefore we pointed to the need to get to grips with the dynamic 
between conceptual and empirical work, between theory and practice and between substantive 
and methodological issues (the 'what' and the 'how'), between the individual and the structural 
(Gonin, Palzzo & Hoffrage, 2012) and between different disciplines – we focused here on 
philosophy and sociology.  
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Second, we need to be reflective and reflexive about the conceptual baggage and the nature of 
the practices that are imported from the various disciplines that become part of the finance 
ethics landscape. Inclusion of the term reflexive indicates that the outcome of reflection on the 
issues associated with each discipline is not the rejection of some aspect of it and the 
incorporation of others. It urges us instead to consider the implications of those inclusions and 
exclusions for the future shape and nature of the field. Without reflexivity the risk of 
reductionism (research as a set of technical procedures) and the replacement of one set of 
orthodoxies with another is increased. If the paucity of qualitative empirical work in the field 
of financial ethics is simply taken to be indicative of the failure to be sufficiently catholic in 
the approach to research, which can be remedied simply by the inclusion of such work, we 
would suggest this creates rather than solves a problem. To raise but one issue for 
consideration, if the research instrument in qualitative research is the researcher, is it 
desirable, or even possible, to aim for objective, value-neutral research? What are the 
consequences for objectivity here? And what kind of people want to be research instruments? 
 
 
The third point relates to awareness of the contextual location of academic endeavour which 
includes awareness of the influences of the temporal. This requires in turn a greater awareness 
of our historical location and the incorporation of an historical perspective as part of our 
reflexive deliberations on the emergence and development of the field of finance ethics. Talk 
of the financial crisis is symptomatic of the absence, or at least the sidelining, of such a 
perspective. An outstanding example of how to employ a historical perspective can be found 
in Whitley's (1986) paper on the transformation of business finance into financial economics 
on which we drew earlier. We also sketched out an example of how events on the broader 
stage were influential, wittingly or unwittingly, on the business ethics research agenda over 
time. A more reflexive stance not only on the influences that external forces bring to bear on 
research agendas but also on the historical location of those events themselves already 
suggests an engagement with real world issues. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Financial ethics as an academic field has, we have argued, the potential to engage with 
debates about financial crises. It also has the potential to provide answers to why they happen 
and why they are perceived as crises and (dare we say?) to offer ideas about their prevention. 
And yet finance ethics is a neglected field that has failed to establish a body of knowledge to 
serve these purposes and, more importantly, to contribute to understanding of what finance 
and ethics mean in times of stability. There are lacunae that cannot be adequately filled by 
popular and political debate, but which are happening nevertheless. In this chapter we aimed, 
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firstly, to offer some reasons for the absence of a sustained and substantial academic 
contribution to debates about, and responses to, the financial crisis. We also argued that it is 
not enough to think more finance ethics without suitable reflection on how such knowledge is 
generated. The aim should be to think more critically, penetratingly and strategically with the 
intention of creating a body of knowledge that enhances and furthers good everyday practice 
whilst mitigating, if not preventing, both the occurrence and effects of more extreme 
conditions. We set out some of the ways in which thinking well might be accomplished or 
even flourish, attending both to the academic aspects of the field and to its wider societal, 
political and historical location, although these are by no means separate projects. Due regard 
to the real world renders the justification of abstracted academic modelling problematic, just 
as rigorous, empirically supported and defensible ideas can influence thinking about real 
world events. Engaging with these issues is not only intrinsically valuable. Thinking well 
about, if not of, the financial system, moreover, should offer excellent returns not only in 
terms of individual and disciplinary reputation and the opportunity to increase academic and 
intellectual capital but, given the human cost associated with failures in financial systems, to 
society as a whole. 
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